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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
BANKRUPTCY

GENERAL 
EXEMPTIONS. 
FEDERAL CHILD CREDIT. The debtor filed for Chapter 7 in 
January 2003 and the debtor’s 2002 tax return claimed a refund 
resulting from the general child tax credit and the additional child 
tax credit. The debtor claimed the refund as exempt under 735 
Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-1001(g)(1) as public assistance payments. 
The court held that the general child tax credit was not a refundable 
credit; therefore, the general child tax credit was not exempt. 
Because the additional child tax credit was refundable and was 
subject to income limitations, the additional child tax credit was 
exempt. In re Koch, 299 B.R. 523 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003). 
HOMESTEAD. The debtor owned 85.51 acres of rural land 
divided into three contiguous tracts of 59 acres, a 20 foot strip of 
land, and 26 acres on which the debtor had a 1.34 acre homestead. 
The 26 acre tract also was used for a campground and trailer 
park. The 59 acre tract contained buildings, sewage treatment 
facilities and recreational areas used in conjunction with the 
campground. The 26 acre tract was conveyed to a corporation 
wholly-owned by the debtors, in order to obtain financing to 
develop the campground. The debtors refinanced the loan into a 
personal loan secured by the 26 acres; however, there was no 
conveyance of the property to the debtors personally. The debtors 
claimed the 85.51 acres as part of their exempt homestead under 
Tex. Prop. Code § 41.002 and a judgment creditor objected based 
on ownership of the land by the corporation and the use of all but 
the 1.34 acres as a business. The Bankruptcy Court allowed only 
the 1.34 acres as eligible for the rural homestead exemption 
because the 26 and 59 acre parcels were used for businesses. On 
appeal, the District Court reversed as to the 26 acres, holding 
that the statute did not prohibit use of parts of a rural homestead 
for a business. The court noted that a reason for the large size of 
the exemption was to accommodate farmers who used the land 
to make a living. The court also found that the conveyance to the 
corporation had no substance because no title was passed, no 
compensation was paid and the debtors continued to use the 
property in the same manner as before the conveyance. On further 
appeal, the appellate court agreed in part with the District Court 
and reversed the initial Bankruptcy Court ruling; however, as to 
both 26 and 59 acre parcels. The case was remanded for a 
determination as to whether the debtor had abandoned a 
homestead interest in the 26 acre parcel as part of the conveyance 
to the corporation. In re Perry, 345 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2003), 
aff’g, 289 B.R. 860 (W.D. Tex. 2003), rev’g in part and aff’g in 
part, 267 B.R. 759 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001). 
CHAPTER 13 
DISPOSABLE INCOME. The debtors’ Chapter 13 plan was 
confirmed and contained a provision that all income tax refunds 
to which the taxpayers became entitled during the plan were to 
be included in disposable income. The plan ended on April 4, 
2001 and the debtors received a discharge on April 24, 2001. The 
trustee then learned that the debtors received an income tax refund 
for 2000 taxes and sought to include the refund in disposable 
income. The court held that the debtors became entitled to the 
refund on December 31, 2000; therefore, the refund was included 
in disposable income under the plan. In re Midkiff, 342 F.3d 
1194 (10th Cir. 2003), aff’g, 271 B.R. 383 (Bankr. 10th Cir. 
2002). 
The debtors filed for Chapter 13 and excluded from disposable 
income monthly payments of $567 for parochial school tuition 
for their children. The plan provided for monthly payments of 
$450, or 27 percent, to unsecured creditors. If the tuition was 
included in disposable income, the payments would provide 62 
percent to the creditors. The debtors argued that the tuition was 
excludible as a charitable deduction. The court noted a case, In re 
Grawey, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 2124 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 2001), 
in which private school tuition was excluded from disposable 
income where the debtor sacrificed other excludible expenses to 
save the tuition. The court also cited In re Burgos, 248 B.R. 446 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000), where the debtor agreed to extend the 
plan to six years and the creditors would receive 70 percent of 
their claims. In this case, the court noted that the debtors had 
claimed several excessive expenses and refused to extend the plan 
beyond three years; therefore, the court held that the tuition would 
be considered disposable income and denied confirmation of the 
plan. In re Lynch, 299 B.R. 776 (W.D. N.C. 2003). 
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL

PROGRAMS

COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN LABELING. The AMS has 
issued proposed regulations implementing the country-of-origin 
labeling program passed by the Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002 (the implementation of which has recently 
been delayed for two years). 68 Fed. Reg. 61943 (Oct. 30, 2003). 
The AMS has announced an extension of the comment time for 
the regulations. See also McEowen, “Country of Origin Labeling,” 
14 Agric. L. Dig. 65 (2003). 68 Fed. Reg. 71039 (Dec. 22, 2003). 
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
ACT. The debtor had operated cafeterias and had purchased 
commodities from a supplier. The invoices provided for payment 
in 30 days but the debtor failed to make several payments on time. 
The sales agents for each party negotiated a weekly payment plan 
by e-mail which continued until the debtor filed for bankruptcy. 
The court found that the e-mails did not reach a complete agreement 
because not all of the terms were settled. The supplier sought to 
recover on the PACA trust but the debtor argued that the payment 
settlement was a waiver of the supplier’s PACA trust rights. The 
court noted that, in two cases, Greg Orchards & Produce, Inc. v. 
Roncone, 180 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 1999) and Tom Lange Co., Inc. v. 
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Lombardo Fruit and Produce Co., 12 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 1993), 
the courts had held that a written agreement to accept payment 
other than in 30 days was a waiver of PACA trust right. The court 
declined to follow those cases because such a rule would 
discourage supplier flexibility in accepting payment after 30 days. 
The court held that the supplier did not waive its PACA trust rights 
because no final agreement was reached and the supplier’s agent 
did not have authority to waive the supplier’s PACA rights. In re 
Cafeteria Operators, Inc., 299 B.R. 411 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
2003). 
FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
ALTERNATE VALUATION DATE. The Deficit Reduction 
Act of 1984 provided that the alternate valuation date election 
may be made on the estate tax return, whether it is filed timely 
or late, as long as the return is filed no more than one year after 
the due date, including extensions. Temp. Treas. Reg. §  301.9100­
6T(b) reflects this change to the law and provides that once a 
return that fails to make the election is filed, the election may 
not be made on a subsequent return unless the subsequent return 
is filed by the due date (including extensions) of the original 
return. This limitation is not found in Treas. Reg. §§ 301.9100­
1, 301.9100-3 that apply to all requests for an extension of time 
to make an election submitted to the IRS on or after December 
31, 1997. The IRS has issued proposed regulations which reflect 
the change made by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. In 
addition, the proposed regulations remove Temp. Treas. Reg. § 
301.9100-6T(b) so that estates that fail to make the alternate 
valuation election on the last estate tax return filed before the 
due date or the first return filed after the due date will be able to 
request an extension of time to make the election under the 
provisions of Treas. Reg. §§ 301.9100-1 and 301.9100-3. 
However, in view of the statutory one year limitation imposed 
under I.R.C. § 2032(d)(2), no request for an extension of time 
will be granted if the request is submitted to the IRS more than 
one year after the due date of the return (including extensions of 
time to file actually granted). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
amended I.R.C. § 2032(c)(2) to provide that the alternate 
valuation date election may be made only if the election results 
in a decrease both in the value of the gross estate and in the sum 
of the estate tax and generation-skipping transfer tax liability 
(reduced by credits allowable against these taxes). The proposed 
regulations also provide guidance on making a protective election 
under I.R.C. § 2032 if, on the initial estate tax return, use of the 
alternate valuation method would not result in a decrease in both 
the value of the gross estate and the sum (reduced by allowable 
credits) of the estate tax and the generation-skipping transfer tax 
liability of the estate. The protective election is revocable on a 
subsequent return filed on or before the due date of the return 
(including extensions of time to file actually granted). If the 
protective election becomes effective to decrease the value of 
the estate and the estate tax, the election becomes irrevocable. 
68 Fed. Reg. 74534 (Dec. 24, 2003), amending Treas. Reg. 
20.2032-1(b). 
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The IRS has issued a revenue 
ruling concerning the charitable deduction eligibility of transfers 
of trust principal to a charitable organization. In the facts of the 
ruling a complex trust owned two adjacent parcels of real property. 
The trust requires the distributions to charities and the trust 
conveyed a perpetual conservation easement on one parcel to a 
state agency. The transfer met the requirements of a qualified 
conservation contribution under I.R.C. § 170(h). Although the trust 
had income, no distributions were made to beneficiaries. The IRS 
ruled that, because the contribution to the charitable organization 
was made from trust principal, no charitable deduction was allowed 
for the transfer. Rev. Rul. 2003-123, I.R.B. 2003-50. 
The taxpayer established an irrevocable trust funded with stock. 
The taxpayer also established a private foundation which qualified 
as a charitable organization for federal tax purposes. The taxpayer 
was the sole director.  The trust made a contribution to the 
foundation. The foundation amended its bylaws to require that a 
separate committee be formed to control the funds contributed by 
the trust and to prevent the taxpayer from having any decision 
authority over the use of the funds. The IRS ruled that the funds 
contributed by the taxpayer’s trust would not be included in the 
taxpayer’s gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. Ltr. Rul. 
200350009, Aug. 25, 2003. 
The decedent had established a trust for the benefit of the decedent 
with a remainder to grandchildren and a charity. The trust was 
modified by agreement of the beneficiaries to provide an immediate 
lump sum payment to the charity. The IRS ruled that the 
modification of the trust was not qualified under I.R.C. § 
2055(e)(3)(B)(i) because the amount and timing of the distribution 
to the charity changed. The IRS noted that the trust could have 
been qualified if the trust was reformed to provide a 5 percent 
distribution to each beneficiary with a remainder to the charity. 
Ltr. Rul. 200350012, Aug. 27, 2003. 
GROSS ESTATE. The decedent owned land which was leased 
to a corporation owned by the decedent which processed and 
marketed nuts produced by the decedent. The written lease had a 
term of 10 years and allowed the corporation tenant to continue 
leasing at will. The lease had no provision for fixtures added to the 
property by the corporation. The fixtures included a the lunchroom, 
pole barn, cold storage units, elb scan room, well, nut bin, shop 
and storage building, steel equipment cover, fumigation chamber, 
water tanks, and asphalt paving. The Tax Court initially held that, 
under California law, a tenant had the right to remove business 
fixtures during the term of the lease. The Tax Court further held 
that the term of a lease did not include holdover tenancies. At the 
decedent’s death, the original term had expired and the corporation 
was leasing the property at will. Therefore, the Tax Court held that 
the business fixtures on the property belonged to the decedent and 
were included in the decedent’s gross estate. In the first appeal, the 
appellate court reversed in a decision designated as not for 
publication. The appellate court held that the lease included an 
implied right to remove trade fixtures because the lease treated 
any holdover as an extension of the original lease terms, including 
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the right to remove trade fixtures. The case was remanded for 
findings as to whether the fixtures involved were trade fixtures 
governed by the lease. On remand, the Tax Court held that the 
improvements were trade fixtures if the improvements could be 
removed without injury to the premises and the improvements were 
not an integral part of the premises. The Tax Court held that the 
lunchroom, pole barn, cold storage units, elb scan room, well, nut 
bin, shop and storage building, steel equipment cover, and asphalt 
paving were all not trade fixtures because the items had become 
integral parts of the premises. The Tax Court also held that the 
fumigation chamber and water tanks were removable trade fixtures 
and not included in the decedent’s estate. In the second appeal, the 
appellate court reversed in a decision designated as not for 
publication. The appellate court noted that, under California case 
law, an entire building added by a tenant for trade purposes was a 
trade fixture; therefore, all of the corporation’s improvements were 
trade fixtures excluded from the decedent’s estate.  Estate of 
Frazier v. Comm’r, 2003-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,473 (9th 
Cir. 2003), rev’g, T.C. Memo. 2002-120, on rem from, 2001-1 
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,404 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’g and rem’g, 
T.C. Memo. 1999-201. 
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING. The taxpayer corporation 
operated a funeral home and sold preneed funeral contracts. Under 
state law, the taxpayer was required to refund upon request any 
payments made under the contracts until the services were 
provided. The taxpayer used the accrual method of accounting and 
included the payments in income only when the services were 
provided. The court held that the taxpayer properly included the 
payments in income because the payments could be refunded at 
any time by the customers as provided by state law. Perry Funeral 
Home, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2003-340. 
CHARITABLE DEDUCTIONS. The IRS has issued a 
consumer alert about the eligibility of taxpayers for a charitable 
deduction for donation of an automobile to a charity. The IRS noted 
that taxpayers used the wrong valuation method for determining 
the amount of the deduction and recommended that taxpayers who 
want to donate their vehicle take the following steps: (1) check 
that the recipient organization qualified; (2) speak directly to the 
charity; (3) examine state filings for more information; (4) itemize 
in order to benefit; (5) calculate the fair market value using more 
factors than only the “Blue book” value; (6) deduct only the car’s 
fair market value; (7) document the charitable contribution 
deduction; and (8) contact state charity and IRS officials when in 
doubt. IR-2003-139. The GAO has released a report which details 
the GAO’s study of vehicle donation programs and the number of 
taxpayers claiming deductions for vehicle donations. The report 
also compares the proceeds received by charities from vehicle 
donations to what donors claimed for those deductions. The GAO 
recommended that the IRS assess: (1) the merits of its compliance 
program for generating audit leads on taxpayers that may have 
overstated their noncash charitable contribution deductions and 
(2) whether forms charities submit when disposing of donated 
property should be recorded and retained. “Vehicle Donations: 
Benefits to Charities and Donors, Limited Program 
Oversight” (GAO-04-73). 
CONSTRUCTIVE RECEIPT. The taxpayer was a tax-
exempt employer and provided paid vacation, sick and personal 
leave for employees under a single paid time off policy. Under 
the policy, employees could elect, prior to January 1 of each year, 
to convert paid time off accumulated during the next year as 
compensation, to be paid ratably over the next year. The IRS 
ruled that the right to make the election would not cause the paid 
time off in the following tax year to be included in the tax year of 
the election. The IRS also ruled that the combined single policy 
was not subject to I.R.C. § 457 and the paid time off or elected 
compensation would be taxed under I.R.C. § 451. Ltr. Rul. 
200351003, Sept. 16, 2003. 
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The taxpayer 
was employed by a talent agency and was fired with much 
publicity in the media. The taxpayer sued the employer for 
defamation and breach of contract and the parties reached a 
settlement agreement which provided for payments. The first 
payment occurred prior to the effective date of the Small Business 
Job Protection Act of 1996 and three payments occurred after 
the Act. The court held that the payments were made in settlement 
of a tort claim but not for physical injuries; therefore, the first 
payment was excludible from income but the payments made 
after the effective date of the Small Business Job Protection Act 
of 1996 were included in income. Polone v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo. 2003-339. 
HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS. The IRS has published 
guidelines, in a question-and-answer format, clarifying several 
issues involving Health Savings Accounts: (1) employer 
contributions to employee HSAs are not subject to FICA taxes; 
(2) HSAs are allowed for employees covered by employer self-
insured medical reimbursement plans with qualifying high 
deductibles; (3) similar to medical savings accounts (MSAs), HSA 
trustees or custodians do not have to determine if withdrawals 
are used for medical costs; (4) special rules cover determining 
the deductible for high-deductible family coverage; (5) like 
MSAs, in addition to banks and insurance companies, persons 
may be approved as HSA custodians under the IRA nonbank 
trustee rules; existing IRA or Archer MSA trustees or custodians 
are automatically approved; (6) HSA trustees or custodians that 
do not sponsor high-deductible plans may request proof or 
certification that an individual is eligible to contribute to an HSA, 
but such action is not required; and (7) otherwise eligible 
individuals without earnings may contribute to HSAs; this 
includes self-employed and unemployed individuals. Notice 
2004-2, I.R.B. 2004-2. 
INTEREST RATE. The IRS has announced that, for the 
period January 1, 2004 through March 31, 2004, the interest rate 
paid on tax overpayments remains at 4 percent (3 percent in the 
case of a corporation) and for underpayments at 4 percent. The 
interest rate for underpayments by large corporations is 6 percent. 
The overpayment rate for the portion of a corporate overpayment 
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exceeding $10,000 is 1.5 percent. Rev. Rul. 2003-126, I.R.B. 
2003-53. 
NET OPERATING LOSSES. The taxpayers operated a real 
estate development business and claimed net operating losses from 
the foreclosure sales of several buildings. However, the taxpayer 
provided no written records of the purchase, operation or sale of 
the properties and provided only vague and inconsistent testimony 
as to the losses. The court upheld the IRS disallowance of most 
of the losses as unsubstantiated. Hoopengarner v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo. 2003-343. 
RETURNS. The IRS has announced the publication on its web 
site of Publication 51 (Rev. January 2004), Circular A, Agricultural 
Employer’s Tax Guide (Including 2004 Wage Withholding and 
Advance Earned Income Credit Payment Tables); Publication 378 
(Rev. December 2003), Fuel Tax Credits and Refunds; and 
Publication 554 (2003), Older Americans’ Tax Guide. See 
www.irs.gov/formspubs/index.html.  These publications can also 
be obtained by calling 1-800-TAX-FORM (1-800-829-3676). 
S CORPORATIONS 
INADVERTENT TERMINATION. At the death of a 
shareholder, the decedent’s S corporation stock was passed to 
three trusts. Although the trusts were intended to be QSSTs and 
the shareholders filed their income tax returns consistent with 
the corporation as an S corporation, the trusts’ beneficiaries failed 
to make timely QSST elections. The IRS granted an extension of 
time to file the elections. Ltr. Rul. 200350011, Aug. 27, 2003. 
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES 
January 2004 
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly 
Short-term 
AFR 1.71 1.70 1.70 1.69 
110 percent AFR 1.88 1.87 1.87 1.86 
120 percent AFR 2.05 2.04 2.03 2.03 
Mid-term 
AFR 3.52 3.49 3.47 3.46 
110 percent AFR 3.88 3.84 3.82 3.81 
120 percent AFR 4.23 4.19 4.17 4.15 
Long-term 
AFR 5.01 4.95 4.92 4.90 
110 percent AFR 5.52 5.45 5.41 5.39 
120 percent AFR 6.03 5.94 5.90 5.87 
Rev. Rul. 2004-2, I.R.B. 2004-2. 
SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME. The taxpayers, husband 
and wife, retired from farming in 1988 and entered into a rental 
agreement with their sons to farm the property with the taxpayers 
and sons sharing profits and expenses equally. The taxpayers 
became members of a local agricultural cooperative by purchasing 
common stock in the cooperative and entering into production 
and marketing agreements with the cooperative. The agreements 
required the taxpayers to either deliver a certain amount of corn 
each year or to purchase corn from the cooperative pool of excess 
corn as a substitute. In return for petitioners’ meeting their 
production and delivery obligations, the cooperative was obligated 
under the agreement to pay the taxpayers: (1) at least 80 percent 
of the loan value per bushel of corn delivered by each petitioner; 
(2) a storage fee and interest in some cases; (3) an additional 
payment (“value-added payment”) for value added to the corn 
as a result of its processing and as further compensation for corn 
delivered by the taxpayers, if the cooperative determined that 
such a payment was warranted after calculating the net proceeds 
from all of its operations for the processing year and if the 
cooperative’s lenders approved; and (4) payments from the 
cooperative’s earnings as patronage dividends in accordance with 
the cooperative‘s bylaws. The taxpayers reported the value-added 
payments as capital gain income, which was not included in self-
employment income. The IRS argued that the value-added 
payments were income from a trade or business and were subject 
to self-employment taxes. The taxpayers argued that the value-
added payments were either investment income attributed to their 
common stock ownership or dividends from the stock, neither 
of which were self-employment income. Initially, the parties 
agreed that the rental of the farm to the sons was not a trade or 
business and the income from the farm was not self-employment 
income. The IRS argued that the taxpayers’ involvement with 
the cooperative was sufficient to qualify as a trade or business in 
that the cooperative’s actions as agents for the taxpayers could 
be attributed to the taxpayers. The court held that the cooperative 
functioned as the taxpayers’ agent and that the taxpayers, although 
retired from active farming, continued to be active in dealing in 
corn through the cooperative. The court also noted that the 
cooperative form of business created an agency relationship with 
the members. The court held that the value-added payments 
resulted from the business of the taxpayers of acquiring and 
selling corn. The court also held that the exclusions of I.R.C. § 
1402(a)(2) (dividends) or 1402(a)(3) (capital assets) did not apply 
to exclude the income from self-employment tax. The appellate 
court affirmed the Tax Court decision. Bot v. Comm’r, No. 02­
2956 (8th Cir. Dec. 22, 2003), aff’g, 118 T.C. 138 (2002). 
TAXPAYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER. The IRS has 
issued new requirements for obtaining an individual taxpayer 
identification number. Treas. Reg. § 301.6109-1(d)(3)(ii) 
currently provides that any taxpayer who is required to furnish 
an ITIN must apply for an ITIN on Form W-7. The regulation 
further states that the application must be made far enough in 
advance of the taxpayer’s first required use of the ITIN to permit 
the issuance of the ITIN in time for the taxpayer to comply with 
the required use (e.g., the timely filing of a tax return). Under 
the IRS’s new ITIN application process, applicants, in general, 
are required to submit the Form W-7 with (and not in advance 
of) the original, completed tax return for which the ITIN is 
needed. Accordingly, taxpayers who comply with the new ITIN 
application process will be deemed to have satisfied the 
requirements of Treas. Reg. § 301.6109-1(d)(3)(ii) with respect 
to the time for applying for an ITIN. The original, completed tax 
return and the Form W-7 must be filed with the IRS office 
specified in the instructions to the Form W-7 regardless of where 
the taxpayer might otherwise be required to file the tax return. 
The tax return will be processed in the same manner as if it were 
filed at the address specified in the tax return instructions. No 
separate filing of the tax return (e.g., a copy) with any other IRS 
office is requested or required. Taxpayers are responsible for filing 
the original, completed tax return, with the Form W-7, by the 
due date applicable to the tax return for which the ITIN is needed 
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(generally, April 15 of the year following the calendar year 
covered by the tax return). If a taxpayer requires an ITIN for an 
amended or delinquent return, then the Form W-7 must be 
submitted together with the return to the IRS office specified in 
the instructions accompanying the Form W-7. Notice 2004-1, 
I.R.B. 2004-1. 
LABOR

JOINT EMPLOYER. The plaintiffs were five migrant 
workers who were hired through a farm labor contractor to plant 
trees on property owned by the defendant paper manufacturer. 
The plaintiffs were admitted into the U.S through the H-2B 
temporary visa program and sought payment of minimum wages 
and overtime compensation under the FSLA and MSAWPA. 
The plaintiffs sought recovery from the paper manufacturer as 
a joint employer with the farm labor contractor. The court held 
that the manufacturer was not a joint employer because (1) the 
manufacturer did not assign laborers or tasks, dictate hiring 
decisions, design the laborers’ management structure, govern 
the laborers’ work schedule, or implement laborer discipline; 
(2) the manufacturer did not have the power to hire or fire the 
plaintiffs; (3) the manufacturer did not require continual and 
lengthy employment of the plaintiffs; (4) the type of work did 
not require extensive training; (5) the manufacturer’s business 
did not depend upon the work performed by the plaintiffs; (6) 
the plaintiffs worked more time on land not owned or operated 
by the manufacturer; and (7) the manufacturer did not provide 
employment services such as payment of FICA taxes, insurance, 
transportation or field sanitation facilities. Gonzalez-Sanchez 
v. International Paper Co., 346 F.3d 1017 (11th Cir. 2003). 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS

PERFECTION. The debtor granted a security interest in two 
farm implements to the defendant. The defendant filed financing 
statements under the debtor’s nickname, Terry, instead of the 
debtor’s legal name, Terrance. The debtor captioned the 
bankruptcy petition with the debtor’s legal name but signed the 
petition using Terry. The court noted that the Kansas UCC did 
not define what constituted a proper name to be used in security 
interests and financing statements; therefore, the court held that 
the use of the debtor’s nickname was sufficient to perfect an 
otherwise properly filed financing statement. The court also noted 
that, in Kansas, creditors have two search methods for finding 
security interests, the official method and an internet search 
database. The court found that the internet search method 
provided a broader search parameter which allowed for discovery 
of the debtor’s security interest under the nickname; therefore, 
the use of the nickname did not prevent the discovery of the 
security interest. In re Kinderknecht, 300 B.R. 47 (Bankr. D. 
Kan. 2003). 
IN THE NEWS

PRICE FIXING. Wild blueberry growers who won a class-
action lawsuit against three eastern Maine processors they accused 
of price fixing have asked a judge to freeze $61 million in 
company assets. The 500 Maine growers were represented as a 
group in the lawsuit, which charged that Maine’s three largest 
processors conspired to depress prices paid to the growers in the 
late 1990s. If the court grants the request, any bank or other 
party holding assets of Cherryfield Foods Inc., Jasper Wyman & 
Son of Milbridge and Allen’s Blueberry Freezer of Ellsworth 
would have to freeze the companies’ accounts. The motion seeks 
appointment of a trustee to manage the attachment process. The 
jury’s award of $18.6 million in damages represented the amount 
the growers contend they were shortchanged between the 1996 
and 1999 seasons. Based on that, the interest alone has been 
calculated at more than $5 million as of December 1, 2003. The 
damages could be trebled because of the case’s antitrust 
component, but that has not yet occurred. Associated Press. 
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